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Abstract—With the increasing prevalence of location-aware
devices, trajectory data has been generated and collected in
various application domains. Trajectory data carries rich in-
formation that is useful for many data analysis tasks. Yet,
improper publishing and use of trajectory data could jeopardize
individual privacy. However, it has been shown that existing
privacy-preserving trajectory data publishing methods derived
from partition-based privacy models, for example k-anonymity,
are unable to provide sufficient privacy protection.
In this paper, motivated by the data publishing scenario at the
Socie´te´ de transport de Montre´al (STM), the public transit agency
in Montreal area, we study the problem of publishing trajectory
data under the rigorous differential privacy model. We propose
an efficient data-dependent yet differentially private sanitization
algorithm, which is applicable to different types of trajectory
data. The efficiency of our approach comes from adaptively
narrowing down the output domain by building a noisy prefix
tree based on the underlying data. Moreover, as a post-processing
step, we make use of the inherent constraints of a prefix tree to
conduct constrained inferences, which lead to better utility. This
is the first paper to introduce a practical solution for publishing
large volume of trajectory data under differential privacy. We
examine the utility of sanitized data in terms of count queries
and frequent sequential pattern mining. Extensive experiments
on real-life trajectory data from the STM demonstrate that our
approach maintains high utility and is scalable to large trajectory
datasets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, location-aware devices, such as
RFID tags, cell phones, GPS navigation systems, and point of
sale (POS) terminals, have been widely deployed in various
application domains. Such devices generate large volume of
trajectory data that could be used for many important data
analysis tasks, such as marketing analysis [1], long-term net-
work planning [2], customer behavior analysis [3], and demand
forecasting [1]. However, trajectory data often contains sensi-
tive personal information, and improper publishing and use
of trajectory data may violate individual privacy. The privacy
concern of publishing trajectory data is best exemplified by
the case of the Socie´te´ de transport de Montre´al (STM,
http://www.stm.info), the public transit agency in Montreal
area.
In 2007, the STM deployed the smart card automated fare
collection (SCAFC) system as a secure method of user vali-
dation and fare collection. In addition to revenue collection,
the system generates and collects passengers’ trajectory data
every day. Transit information, such as smart card ID and
station ID, is collected when a passenger swipes his smart
card at a SCAFC system, and is then stored in a central
database management system, where the transit information of
a passenger is organized as an ordered list of stations, a kind
of trajectory data (see a formal definition in Section III-A).
Periodically, the IT department of the STM shares such
trajectory data with other departments, e.g., the marketing
department, for basic data analysis, and publishes its trajectory
data to external research institutions for more complex data
mining tasks. According to the preliminary research [3], [4],
[5], the STM can substantially benefit from trajectory data
analysis at strategic, tactical, and operational levels. Yet, it
has also realized that the nature of trajectory data is raising
major privacy concerns on the part of card users in information
sharing [4]. This fact has been an obstacle to further conduct
trajectory data analysis tasks and even perform regular com-
mercial operations. Similarly, many other sectors, for example
cell phone communication and credit card payment [6], have
been facing the dilemma in trajectory data publishing and
individual privacy protection.
The privacy concern in trajectory data sharing has spawned
some research [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12] on privacy-
preserving trajectory data publishing based on partition-based
privacy models [13], for example k-anonymity [14] (or (k, δ)-
anonymity [7]) and confidence bounding [8], [11]. However,
many types of privacy attacks, such as composition attack [13],
deFinetti attack [15] and foreground knowledge attack [16],
have been identified on the approaches derived using the
partition-based privacy models, demonstrating their vulnera-
bility to an adversary’s background knowledge. Due to the
deterministic nature of partition-based privacy models, it is
foreseeable that more types of privacy attacks could be dis-
covered on these privacy models in the future. Consequently, in
recent years differential privacy [17] has become the de facto
successor to partition-based privacy models. Differential pri-
vacy provides provable privacy guarantees independent of an
adversary’s background knowledge and computational power
(this claim may not be valid in some special cases [18], but
is still correct for our scenario, as discussed in Section IV-C).
Differential privacy requires that any computation based on
the underlying database should be insensitive to the change of
a single record. Therefore, a record owner can be ensured that
any privacy breach would not be a result of participating in a
database.
The traditional non-interactive approaches [19], [20], [21],
[22] for generating differentially-private releases are data-
independent in the sense that all possible entries in the output
domain need to be explicitly considered no matter what the
underlying database is. For high-dimensional data, such as
trajectory data, this is computationally infeasible. Consider a
trajectory database D with all locations drawn from a universe
of size m. Suppose the maximum length of trajectories (the
number of locations in a trajectory) in D is l. These approaches
need to generate
∑l
i=1m
i = m
l+1−m
m−1 output entries. For a
trajectory database with m = 1, 000 and l = 20, it requires
to generate 1060 entries. Hence, these approaches are not
computationally applicable with today’s systems to real-life
trajectory databases.
Two very recent papers [23], [24] point out that more
efficient and more effective solutions could be achieved by
carefully making use of the underlying database. We call such
solutions data-dependent. The general idea of data-dependent
solutions is to adaptively narrow down the output domain by
using noisy answers obtained from the underlying database.
However, the methods in [23], [24] cannot be applied to
trajectory data for two reasons. First, the methods in [23], [24]
require taxonomy trees to guide the data publication process.
For trajectory data, there does not exist a logical taxonomy
tree due to the sequentiality among locations. Second, the
methods only work for sets, yet a trajectory may contain a
bag of locations. Therefore, non-trivial efforts are needed to
develop a differentially private data publishing approach for
trajectory data.
Protecting individual privacy is one aspect of sanitizing
trajectory data. Another equally important aspect is preserving
utility in sanitized data for data analysis. Motivated by the
STM case, in this paper, we are particularly interested in two
kinds of data mining tasks, namely count queries (see a formal
definition in Section III-D) and frequent sequential pattern
mining [25]. Count queries, as a general data analysis task, are
the building block of many more advanced data mining tasks.
In the STM scenario, with accurate answers to count queries
over sanitized data, data recipients can obtain the answers
to questions, such as “how many passengers have visited
both stations Guy-Concordia and McGill 1 within the last
week”. Frequent sequential pattern mining, as a concrete data
mining task, helps, for example, the STM better understand
passengers’ transit patterns and consequently allows the STM
to adjust its network geometry and schedules in order to
better utilize its existing resources. These utility requirements
naturally demand a solution that publishes data, not merely
data mining results.
Contribution. In this paper, we study the problem of pub-
1Guy-Concordia and McGill are two metro stations on the green line of
the Montreal metro network.
lishing trajectory data that simultaneously protects individual
privacy under the framework of differential privacy and pro-
vides high utility for different data mining tasks. This is the
first paper that introduces a practical solution for publishing
large volume of real-life trajectory data via differential privacy.
The previous works [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12] on privacy-
preserving trajectory data publishing cannot be used to achieve
differential privacy because of their deterministic nature. We
summarize the major contributions of the paper as follows.
• We propose a non-interactive data-dependent sanitization
algorithm of runtime complexity O(|D| · |L|) to generate
a differentially private release for trajectory data, where
|D| is the size of the underlying database D and |L| is the
size of the location universe. The efficiency is achieved by
constructing a noisy prefix tree, which adaptively guides
the algorithm to circumvent certain output sub-domains
based on the underlying database.
• We design a statistical process for efficiently constructing
a noisy prefix tree under Laplace mechanism. This is
vital to the scalability of processing datasets with large
location universe sizes.
• We make use of two sets of inherent constraints of a
prefix tree to conduct constrained inferences, which helps
generate a more accurate release. This is the first paper
of applying constrained inferences to non-interactive data
publishing.
• We conduct an extensive experimental study over the
real-life trajectory dataset from the STM. We examine
utility of sanitized data for two different data mining
tasks, namely count queries (a generic data analysis
task) and frequent sequential pattern mining (a concrete
data mining task). We demonstrate that our approach
maintains high utility and is scalable to large volume of
real-life trajectory data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews related work. Section III provides the preliminaries
for our solution. A two-stage sanitization algorithm for tra-
jectory data is proposed in Section IV, and comprehensive
experimental results are presented in Section V. Finally, we
conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review the state of the art of privacy-
preserving trajectory data publishing techniques and recent
applications of differential privacy.
A. Privacy-Preserving Trajectory Data Publishing
Due to the ubiquitousness of trajectory data, some recent
works [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12] have started to study
privacy-preserving trajectory data publishing from different
perspectives. Abul et al. [7] propose the (k, δ)-anonymity
model based on the inherent imprecision of sampling and
positioning systems, where δ represents the possible location
imprecision. The general idea of [7] is to modify trajectories
by space translation so that k different trajectories co-exist in
a cylinder of the radius δ. Terrovitis and Mamoulis [8] model
an adversary’s background knowledge as a set of projections of
trajectories in a trajectory database, and consequently propose
a data suppression technique that limits the confidence of
inferring the presence of a location in a trajectory to a pre-
defined probability threshold. Yarovoy et al. [9] propose to k-
anonymize a moving object database (MOD) by considering
timestamps as the quasi-identifiers (QIDs). Adversaries are
assumed to launch privacy attacks based on attack graphs.
Their approach first identifies anonymization groups and then
generalizes the groups to common regions according to the
QIDs while achieving minimal information loss. Monreale et
al. [12] present an approach based on spatial generalization in
order to achieve k-anonymity. The novelty of their approach
lies in a generalization scheme that depends on the underlying
trajectory dataset rather than a fixed grid hierarchy.
Hu et al. [10] present the problem of k-anonymizing a
trajectory database with respect to a sensitive event database.
The goal is to make sure that every event is shared by at
least k users. Specifically, they develop a new generalization
mechanism known as local enlargement, which achieves better
utility than conventional hierarchy- or partition-based gener-
alization. Chen et al. [11] consider the emerging trajectory
data publishing scenario, in which users’ sensitive attributes
are published with trajectory data and consequently propose
the (K,C)L-privacy model that thwarts both identity linkages
on trajectory data and attribute linkages via trajectory data.
They develop a generic solution for various data utility metrics
by use of local suppression. All these approaches [7], [8],
[9], [10], [11], [12] are built based on partition-based privacy
models, and therefore are not able to provide sufficient pri-
vacy protection for trajectory data. The major contribution of
our paper is the use of differential privacy, which provides
significantly stronger privacy guarantees.
B. Applications of Differential Privacy
In the last few years, differential privacy has been employed
in various applications. Currently most of the research on
differential privacy concentrates on the interactive setting with
the goal of either reducing the magnitude of added noise [26],
[27], [28], [29] or releasing certain data mining results [30],
[31], [32], [33], [34]. Dwork [35] provides an overview of
recent works on differential privacy.
The works closest to ours are by Blum et al. [19], Dwork
et al. [20], Xiao et al. [21], Xiao et al. [22], Mohammed et
al. [23], and Chen et al. [24]. All these works consider non-
interactive data publishing under differential privacy. Blum et
al. [19] demonstrate that it is possible to release synthetic
private databases that are useful for all queries over a dis-
cretized domain from a concept class with polynomial Vapnik-
Chervonenkis dimension 2. However, their mechanism is not
efficient, taking runtime complexity of superpoly(|C|, |I|),
where |C| is the size of a concept class and |I| the size of
the universe. Dwork et al. [20] propose a recursive algorithm
2Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension is a measure of the complexity of a
concept in the class.
TABLE I
NOTATIONAL CONVENTIONS
Symbol Description
A A privacy mechanism
∆f The global sensitivity of the function f
ǫ, ǫ¯ The total privacy budget, a portion of privacy budget
L, Li The location universe, a location in the universe
T, ti A trajectory, a location in a trajectory
ls(T ) The set of locations in trajectory T
D, D˜ A trajectory database, a sanitized database of D
Q(D) A count query over the database D
PT A prefix tree
Root(PT ) The virtual root of the prefix tree PT
prefix(v,PT ) The prefix represented by the node v of PT
tr(v) The set of trajectories with the prefix prefix(v,PT )
c(v), c˜(v), c¯(v) The noisy count, intermediate estimate and consistent
estimate of |tr(v)| respectively
s Sanity bound
Fk(D) The top-k most frequent sequential patterns of D
|L|, |T |, |D| The size of the location universe, a trajectory, and
a trajectory database respectively
k The number of empty nodes that pass the boolean tests
of generating a synthetic database with runtime complexity of
poly(|C|, |I|). This improvement, however, is still insufficient
to handle real-life trajectory datasets due to the exponential
size of |C|. Xiao et al. [21] propose a wavelet-transformation
based approach for relational data to lower the magnitude of
noise, rather than adding independent Laplace noise. Xiao et
al. [22] propose a two-step algorithm for relational data. It
first issues queries for every possible combination of attribute
values to the PINQ interface [36], and then produces a
generalized output based on the perturbed results. Similarly,
the algorithms [21], [22] need to process all possible entries in
the entire output domain, giving rise to a scalability problem
in the context of trajectory data.
Two very recent papers [23], [24] point out that data-
dependent approaches are more efficient and more effective
for generating a differentially private release. Mohammed et
al. [23] propose a generalization-based sanitization algorithm
for relational data with the goal of classification analysis.
Chen et al. [24] propose a probabilistic top-down partitioning
algorithm for set-valued data. Both approaches [23], [24]
make use of taxonomy trees to adaptively narrow down the
output domain. However, due to the reasons mentioned in
Section I, they cannot be applied to trajectory data, in which
sequentiality is a major concern.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we define a trajectory database and a
prefix tree, review differential privacy, and present the utility
requirements. The notational conventions are summarized in
Table I.
A. Trajectory Database
Let L = {L1, L2, · · · , L|L|} be the universe of locations,
where |L| is the size of the universe. Without loss of generality,
we consider locations as discrete spatial areas in a map. For
example, in the STM case, L represents all stations in the STM
transportation network. This assumption also applies to many
TABLE II
SAMPLE TRAJECTORY DATABASE
Rec. # Path
1 L1 → L2 → L3
2 L1 → L2
3 L3 → L2 → L1
4 L1 → L2 → L4
5 L1 → L2 → L3
6 L3 → L2
7 L1 → L2 → L4 → L1
8 L3 → L1
other types of trajectory data, e.g., purchase records, where
a location is a store’s address. We model a trajectory as an
ordered list of locations drawn from the universe.
Definition 3.1 (Trajectory): A trajectory T of length |T | is
an ordered list of locations T = t1 → t2 → · · · → t|T |, where
∀1 ≤ i ≤ |T |, ti ∈ L.
A location may occur multiple times in T , and may occur
consecutively in T . Therefore, given L = {L1, L2, L3, L4},
T = L1 → L2 → L2 is a valid trajectory. In some cases,
a trajectory may include timestamps. We point out that our
approach also works for this type of trajectory data and discuss
the details in Section IV-D. A trajectory database is composed
of a multiset of trajectories; each trajectory represents the
movement history of a record owner. A formal definition is
as follow.
Definition 3.2 (Trajectory Database): A trajectory
database D of size |D| is a multiset of trajectories
D = {D1, D2, · · · , D|D|}.
Table II presents a sample trajectory database with L =
{L1, L2, L3, L4}. In the rest of the paper, we use the term
database and dataset interchangeably.
B. Prefix Tree
A trajectory database can be represented in a more compact
way in terms of a prefix tree. A prefix tree groups trajectories
with the same prefix into the same branch. We first define a
prefix of a trajectory below.
Definition 3.3 (Trajectory Prefix): A trajectory S = s1 →
s2 → · · · → s|S| is a prefix of a trajectory T = t1 → t2 →
· · · → t|T |, denoted by S  T , if and only if |S| ≤ |T | and
∀1 ≤ i ≤ |S|, si = ti.
For example, L1 → L2 is a prefix of L1 → L2 → L4 → L3,
but L1 → L4 is not. Note that a trajectory prefix is a trajectory
per se. Next, we formally define a prefix tree below.
Definition 3.4 (Prefix Tree): A prefix tree PT of a trajec-
tory database D is a triplet PT = (V,E,Root(PT )), where
V is the set of nodes labeled with locations, each correspond-
ing to a unique trajectory prefix in D; E is the set of edges,
representing transitions between nodes; Root(PT ) ∈ V is the
virtual root of PT . The unique trajectory prefix represented
by a node v ∈ V , denoted by prefix(v,PT ), is an ordered
list of locations starting from Root(PT ) to v.
Root
L1 : 5
L2 : 5
L4 : 2L3 : 2
L1 : 1
L3 : 3
L1 : 1 L2 : 2
L1 : 1
Fig. 1. The prefix tree of the sample data
Each node v ∈ V of PT keeps a doublet in the form of
〈tr(v), c(v)〉, where tr(v) is the set of trajectories in D having
the prefix prefix(v,PT ), that is, {D ∈ D : prefix(v,PT ) 
D}, and c(v) is a noisy version of |tr(v)| (e.g., |tr(v)| plus
Laplace noise). tr(Root(PT )) contains all trajectories in D.
We call the set of all nodes of PT at a given depth i a level
of PT , denoted by level(i,PT ). Root(PT ) is at depth zero.
Figure 1 illustrates the prefix tree of the sample database in
Table II, where each node v is labeled with its location and
|tr(v)|.
C. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a relatively new privacy model stem-
ming from the field of statistical disclosure control. Differen-
tial privacy, in general, requires that the removal or addition
of a single database record does not significantly affect the
outcome of any analysis based on the database. Therefore,
for a record owner, any privacy breach will not be a result of
participating in the database since anything that can be learned
from the database with his record can also be learned from the
one without his record. We formally define differential privacy
in the non-interactive setting [19] as follow.
Definition 3.5 (ǫ-differential privacy): A non-interactive
privacy mechanism A gives ǫ-differential privacy if for any
database D1 and D2 differing on at most one record, and for
any possible sanitized database D˜ ∈ Range(A),
Pr[A(D1) = D˜] ≤ e
ǫ × Pr[A(D2) = D˜] (1)
where the probability is taken over the randomness of A.
Two principal techniques for achieving differential pri-
vacy have appeared in the literature, namely Laplace mech-
anism [17] and exponential mechanism [37]. A fundamental
concept of both techniques is the global sensitivity of a
function [17] mapping underlying databases to (vectors of)
reals.
Definition 3.6 (Global Sensitivity): For any function f :
D → Rd, the sensitivity of f is
∆f = max
D1,D2
||f(D1)− f(D2)||1 (2)
for all D1,D2 differing in at most one record.
Functions with lower sensitivity are more tolerant towards
changes of a database and, therefore, allow more accurate
differentially private mechanisms.
Laplace Mechanism. For the analysis whose outputs are real,
a standard mechanism to achieve differential privacy is to
add Laplace noise to the true output of a function. Dwork et
al. [17] propose the Laplace mechanism which takes as inputs
a database D, a function f , and the privacy parameter ǫ. The
noise is generated according to a Laplace distribution with the
probability density function (pdf) p(x|λ) = 12λe−|x|/λ, where
λ is determined by both ∆f and the desired privacy parameter
ǫ.
Theorem 3.1: For any function f : D → Rd, the mechanism
A
A(D) = f(D) + Laplace(∆f/ǫ) (3)
gives ǫ-differential privacy.
For example, for a single count query Q over a dataset
D, returning Q(D) + Laplace(1/ǫ) maintains ǫ-differential
privacy because a count query has a sensitivity 1.
Exponential Mechanism. For the analysis whose outputs
are not real or make no sense after adding noise, McSherry
and Talwar [37] propose the exponential mechanism that
selects an output from the output domain, r ∈ R, by taking
into consideration its score of a given utility function q in
a differentially private manner. The exponential mechanism
assigns exponentially greater probabilities of being selected
to outputs of higher scores so that the final output would be
close to the optimum with respect to q. The chosen utility
function q should be insensitive to changes of any particular
record, that is, has a low sensitivity. Let the sensitivity of q
be ∆q = max∀r,D1,D2 |q(D1, r)− q(D2, r)|.
Theorem 3.2: Given a utility function q : (D×R)→ R for
a database D, the mechanism A,
A(D, q) =
{
return r with probability ∝ exp(
ǫq(D, r)
2∆q
)
}
(4)
gives ǫ-differential privacy.
Composition Property. For a sequence of computations, its
privacy guarantee is provided by the composition properties.
Any sequence of computations that each provides differen-
tial privacy in isolation also provides differential privacy in
sequence, which is known as sequential composition [36].
Theorem 3.3: Let Ai each provide ǫi-differential privacy.
A sequence of Ai(D) over the database D provides (
∑
i ǫi)-
differential privacy.
In some special cases, in which a sequence of computations
is conducted on disjoint databases, the privacy cost does not
accumulate, but depends only on the worst guarantee of all
computations. This is known as parallel composition [36]. This
property could and should be used to obtain good performance.
Theorem 3.4: Let Ai each provide ǫi-differential privacy. A
sequence of Ai(Di) over a set of disjoint datasets Di provides
(max(ǫi))-differential privacy.
D. Utility Requirements
The sanitized data is mainly used to perform two different
data mining tasks, namely count query and frequent sequential
pattern mining [25]. Count queries, as a general data analysis
task, are the building block of many data mining tasks. We
formally define count queries over a trajectory database below.
Definition 3.7 (Count Query): For a given set of locations
L drawn from the universe L, a count query Q over a database
D is defined to be Q(D) = |{D ∈ D : L ⊆ ls(D)}|, where
ls(D) returns the set of locations in D.
Note that sequentiality among locations is not considered in
count queries, because the major users of count queries are,
for example, the personnel of the marketing department of the
STM, who are merely interested in users’ presence in certain
stations for marketing analysis, but not the sequentiality of
visiting. Instead, the preservation of sequentiality in sanitized
data is examined by frequent sequential pattern mining. We
measure the utility of a count query over the sanitized database
D˜ by its relative error [21], [29], [24] with respect to the true
result over the original database D, which is computed as:
|Q(D˜)−Q(D)|
max{Q(D), s}
,
where s is a sanity bound used to mitigate the influences of
the queries with extremely small selectivities [21], [29], [24].
For frequent sequential pattern mining, we measure the
utility of sanitized data in terms of true positive, false positive
and false drop [38]. Given a positive number k, we denote
the set of top k most frequent sequential patterns identified
on the original database D by Fk(D) and the set of frequent
sequential patterns on the sanitized database D˜ by Fk(D˜).
True positive is the number of frequent sequential patterns
in Fk(D) that are correctly identified in Fk(D˜), that is,
|Fk(D) ∩ Fk(D˜)|. False positive is defined to be the number
of infrequent sequential patterns in D that are mistakenly
included in Fk(D˜), that is,
|Fk(D˜)−Fk(D) ∩ Fk(D˜)|.
False drop is defined to be the number of frequent sequential
patterns in Fk(D) that are wrongly omitted in Fk(D˜), that is,
|Fk(D) ∪ Fk(D˜)−Fk(D˜)|.
Since in our setting |Fk(D)| = |Fk(D˜)| = k, false positives
always equal false drops.
IV. SANITIZATION ALGORITHM
We first provide an overview of our two-step sanitization
algorithm in Algorithm 1. Given a raw trajectory dataset D,
a privacy budget ǫ, and a specified height of the prefix tree
h, it returns a sanitized dataset D˜ satisfying ǫ-differential
Algorithm 1 Trajectory Data Sanitization Algorithm
Input: Raw trajectory dataset D
Input: Privacy budget ǫ
Input: Height of the prefix tree h
Output: Sanitized dataset D˜
1: Noisy prefix tree PT ← BuildNoisyPrefixTree(D, ǫ, h);
2: Sanitized dataset D˜ ← GeneratePrivateRelease(PT );
3: return D˜;
privacy. BuildNoisyPrefixTree builds a noisy prefix tree PT
for D using a set of count queries; GeneratePrivateRelease
employs a utility boosting technique on PT and then generates
a differentially private release.
A. Noisy Prefix Tree Construction
The noisy prefix tree of the raw trajectory dataset D cannot
be simply generated at a time by scanning the dataset once,
as the way we construct a deterministic prefix tree. To satisfy
differential privacy, we need to guarantee that every trajectory
that can be derived from the location universe (either in or not
in D) has certain probability to appear in the sanitized dataset
so that the sensitive information in D could be masked.
Our strategy for BuildNoisyPrefixTree is to recursively group
trajectories in D into disjoint sub-datasets based on their
prefixes and resort to the well-understood query model to
guarantee differential privacy. Procedure 1 presents the details
of BuildNoisyPrefixTree. We first create a prefix tree PT with
a virtual root Root(PT ) (Lines 2-4). To build PT , we employ
a uniform privacy budget allocation scheme, that is, divide the
total privacy budget ǫ into equal portions ǫ¯ = ǫh , each is used
for constructing a level of PT (Line 5). In Lines 6-19, we
iteratively construct each level of PT in a noisy way. At each
level, for each node v, we consider every location in L as
v’s potential child u in order to satisfy differential privacy.
Our goal is to identify the children that are associated with
non-zero number of trajectories so that we can continue to
expand them. However, we cannot make decision based on
true numbers, but noisy counts. One important observation
is that all such potential children are associated with disjoint
trajectory subsets and therefore ǫ¯ can be used in full for each
u because of Theorem 3.4.
For a dataset with a very large location universe L, pro-
cessing all locations explicitly may be slow. We provide
an efficient implementation by separately handling potential
child nodes associated with non-zero and zero number of
trajectories (referred as non-empty node and empty node
respectively in the following). For a non-empty node u,
we add Laplace noise to |tr(u)| and use the noisy answer
c(u) = NoisyCount(|tr(u)|, ǫ¯) to decide if it is non-empty.
If c(u) is greater than or equal to the threshold θ = 2
√
2
ǫ¯ (two
times of the standard deviation of noise), we deem that u is
“non-empty” and insert u to PT as v’s child. We choose a
relatively large threshold mainly for the reason of efficiency,
and meanwhile it also has a positive impact on utility because
more noisy nodes can be pruned. Since non-empty nodes
Procedure 1 BuildNoisyPrefixT ree Procedure
Input: Raw trajectory dataset D
Input: Privacy budget ǫ
Input: Height of the prefix tree h
Output: Noisy prefix tree PT
1: i = 0;
2: Create an empty prefix tree PT ;
3: Insert a virtual root Root(PT ) to PT ;
4: Add all trajectories in D to tr(Root(PT ));
5: ǫ¯ = ǫh ;
6: while i < h do
7: for each node v ∈ level(i,PT ) do
8: Generate a candidate set of nodes U from L,
each labeled by a location L ∈ L;
9: for each node u ∈ U do
10: Consider u as v’s child;
11: Add the trajectories D in tr(v) s.t.
prefix(u,PT )  D to tr(u);
12: c(u) = NoisyCount(|tr(u)|, ǫ¯);
13: if c(u) ≥ θ then
14: Add u to PT as v’s child;
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: i++;
19: end while
20: return PT ;
are typically of a small number, this process can be done
efficiently.
For the empty nodes, we need to conduct a series of
independent boolean tests, each calculates NoisyCount(0, ǫ¯)
to check if it passes θ. The number of empty nodes that pass
θ, k, follows the binomial distribution B(m, pθ), where m is
the total number of empty nodes we need to check and pθ is
the probability for a single experiment to succeed. Inspired by
Cormode et al.’s work [39], we design a statistical process for
Laplace mechanism to directly extract k empty nodes without
explicitly processing every empty node (in [39], Cormode et
al. design a statistical process for geometric mechanism [40],
a discretized version of Laplace mechanism).
Theorem 4.1: Independently conducting m pass/not pass
experiments based on Laplace mechanism with privacy budget
ǫ¯ and threshold θ is equivalent to the following steps:
1) Generate a value k from the binomial distribution
B(m, pθ), where pθ = exp(−ǫ¯θ)2 .
2) Select k uniformly random empty nodes without replace-
ment with noisy counts sampled from the distribution
P (x) =
{
0 ∀x < θ
1− exp(ǫ¯θ − ǫ¯x) ∀x ≥ θ
Proof. The probability of a single experiment passing the
Location tr(node)
Root t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8
Noisy Size
L1 t1, t2, t4, t5, t7 6
L1 Ø 2 L2 t1, t2, t4, t5, t7 4
L4 t4, t7 3L3 t3, t6, t8 2
L2 t3, t6 3
L1 t3 2L3 t1, t5 2 L4 t4, t7 3
Fig. 2. The noisy prefix tree of the sample data
threshold θ is
Pr[PASS] =
∫ ∞
θ
ǫ¯
2
exp(−ǫ¯x)dx =
exp(−ǫ¯θ)
2
.
Since the experiments are independent, the number of suc-
cessful experiments, k, follows the binomial distribution
B(m, exp(−ǫ¯θ)2 ). Once k is determined, we can uniformly at
random select k empty nodes. The probability density function
of the noisy counts x for the k empty nodes, conditional on
x ≥ θ, is:
p(x|x ≥ θ) =
{
0 ∀x < θ
ǫ¯
2 exp(−ǫ¯x)
pθ
= ǫ¯exp(ǫ¯θ − ǫ¯x) ∀x ≥ θ
The corresponding cumulative distribution function is:
P (x) =
{
0 ∀x < θ∫ x
θ
ǫ¯exp(ǫ¯θ − ǫ¯x)dx = 1− exp(ǫ¯θ − ǫ¯x) ∀x ≥ θ
This completes the proof.
Selection of h value. We discuss the selection of h value. A
natural choice of h value is the maximum trajectory length of
D. However, this choice raises two problems. First, for most
trajectory databases, the maximum trajectory length is much
longer than the average trajectory length (see Section V-A for
two examples), implying that extremely long trajectories are
of very small supports. Keeping expanding the prefix tree
for such long trajectories is counter-productive: it ends up
with many noisy trajectories that do not exist in the original
database and therefore results in poor utility. Second, in some
cases, the maximum trajectory length itself may be sensitive.
Since the length of a trajectory in D could be arbitrarily large,
the sensitivity of maximum trajectory length is unbounded. It
follows that it is very difficult to design a differentially private
mechanism to obtain a reliable maximum trajectory length.
Evfimievski et al. [38] provides an insightful observation
that could be used for the selection of h value. They point
out that, in the context of transaction data, it is typically
impossible to make transactions of size 10 and longer both
privacy preserving and useful (regardless of the underlying
dataset). This observation also applies to trajectory data. Long
trajectories carry too much sensitive information to achieve a
reasonable trade-off between privacy and utility. Theoretically,
selecting a relatively small h value has a limited negative effect
on the resulting utility. For count queries, long trajectories have
very small supports. Moreover, Procedure 1 does not eliminate
entire long trajectories, but just truncates their tailing parts, and
therefore results in even smaller relative errors. Similarly, for
frequent sequential pattern mining, the elimination of tailing
parts of long trajectories with small supports does not sig-
nificantly affect resulting frequent sequential patterns, which
are usually of a small length. We experimentally confirm our
analysis in Section V.
Example 4.1: Given the trajectory database D in Table II,
the height h = 3, and the calculated threshold θ = 2, the
construction of a possible noisy prefix tree PT is illustrated
in Figure 2. A path of PT may be of a length shorter than h
if it has been considered “empty” before h is reached.
B. Private Release Generation
Based on the noisy prefix tree PT , we can generate
the sanitized database by traversing PT once in postorder,
calculating the number n of trajectories terminated at each
node v and appending n copies of prefix(v,PT ) to the
output. However, due to the noise added to ensure differ-
ential privacy, we may not be able to obtain a meaningful
release. For example, in Figure 2, consider the root-to-leaf
path Root(PT )→ L3 → L2 → L1. We have c(L2) > c(L3),
which is counterintuitive because it is not possible, in general,
to have more trajectories with the prefix prefix(u,PT ) than
trajectories with the prefix prefix(v,PT ), where u is a child
of v in PT . If we leave such inconsistencies unsolved, the
resulting release may not be meaningful and therefore provides
poor utility.
Definition 4.1 (Consistency Constraint): In a non-noisy
prefix tree, there exist two sets of consistency constraints:
1) For any root-to-leaf path p, ∀vi ∈ p, |tr(vi)| ≤
|tr(vi+1)|, where vi is a child of vi+1;
2) For each node v, |tr(v)| ≥∑u∈children(v) |tr(u)|.
Our goal is to enforce such consistency constraints on the
noisy prefix tree in order to produce a consistent and more
accurate private release. We adapt the constrained inference
technique proposed in [26] to adjust the noisy counts of nodes
in the noisy prefix tree so that the constraints defined in
Definition 4.1 are respected. Note that the technique proposed
in [26] cannot be directly applied to our case because: 1)
the noisy prefix tree has an irregular structure (rather than
a complete tree with a fixed degree); 2) the noisy prefix
tree has different constraints |tr(v)| ≥
∑
u∈children(v) |tr(u)|
(rather than |tr(v)| = ∑u∈children(v) |tr(u)|). Consequently,
we propose a two-phase procedure to obtain a consistent
estimate with respect to Definition 4.1 for each node (except
the virtual root) in the noisy prefix tree PT .
We first generate an intermediate estimate for the noisy
count of each node v (except the virtual root) in PT . Consider
a root-to-leaf path p of PT . Let us organize the noisy counts of
nodes vi ∈ p into a sequence S = 〈c(v1), c(v2), · · · , c(v|p|)〉,
where vi is a child of vi+1. Let mean[i, j] denote the
mean of a subsequence of S, 〈c(vi), c(vi+1), ..., c(vj)〉, that
is, mean[i, j] =
∑j
m=i c(vm)
j−i+1 . We compute the intermediate
estimates S˜ by Theorem 4.2 [26].
Theorem 4.2: Let Lm = minj∈[m,n]maxi∈[1,j]mean[i, j]
and Um = maxi∈[1,m]minj∈[i,|p|]mean[i, j]. S˜ =
〈L1, L2, ..., L|p|〉 = 〈U1, U2, ..., U|p|〉.
The result of Theorem 4.2 is the minimum L2 solution [26]
of S that satisfies the first type of constraints in Definition 4.1.
However, a node v in PT appears in |leaves(v,PT )| root-
to-leaf paths, where leaves(v,PT ) denotes the leaves of the
subtree of PT rooted at v, and therefore, has |leaves(v,PT )|
intermediate estimates, each being an independent observation
of the true count |tr(v)|. We compute the consolidated inter-
mediate estimate of v as the mean of the estimates, normally
the best estimate for |tr(v)| [41]. We denote the consolidated
intermediate estimate of v by c˜(v).
After obtaining c˜(v) for each node v, we compute its
consistent estimate c¯(v) in a top-down fashion as follows:
c¯(v) =
{
c˜(v) ifv ∈ level(1,PT )
c˜(v) +min(0,
c¯(w)−∑u∈children(w) c˜(u)
|children(w)| ) otherwise
where w is the parent of v. It follows the intuition that the
observation
∑
u∈children(w) c˜(u) > c¯(w) is strong evidence
that excessive noise is added to the children. Since the
magnitude of noise in c¯(w) is approximately |children(w)|
times smaller than
∑
u∈children(w) c˜(u), it is reasonable to
decrease the children’s counts according to c¯(w). However,
we never increase the children’s counts based on c¯(w) because
a large c¯(w) simply indicates that many trajectories actually
terminate at w. It is easy to see that the consistency constraints
in Definition 4.1 are respected among consistent estimates, and
therefore the proof is omitted here.
Once we obtain the consistent estimate for each node, we
can generate the private release by a postorder traversal of PT .
In Section V, we demonstrate that the constrained inferences
significantly improve utility of sanitized data.
C. Analysis
Privacy Analysis. Kifer and Machanavajjhala [18] point out
that differential privacy must be applied with caution. The
privacy protection provided by differential privacy relates to
the data generating mechanism and deterministic aggregate-
level background knowledge. In most cases, for example the
STM case, the trajectories in the raw database are independent
of each other and therefore the evidence of participation [18]
of a record owner can be eliminated by removing his record.
Furthermore, we assume that no deterministic statistics of the
raw database will ever be released. Hence differential privacy
is appropriate for our problem. We now show that Algorithm 1
satisfies ǫ-differential privacy.
Theorem 4.3: Given the total privacy budget ǫ, Algorithm 1
ensures ǫ-differential privacy.
Proof. Algorithm 1 consists of two steps, namely Build-
NoisyPrefixTree and GeneratePrivateRelease. In the proce-
dure BuildNoisyPrefixTree, our approach appeals to the well-
understood query model to construct the noisy prefix tree PT .
Consider a level of PT . Since all nodes on the same level
contain disjoint sets of trajectories. According to Theorem 3.4,
the entire privacy budget needed for a level is bounded by the
worst case, that is, ǫ¯ = ǫh . The use of privacy budget on
different levels follows Theorem 3.3. Since there are at most
h levels, the total privacy budget needed to build the noisy
prefix tree is ≤ h× ǫ¯ = ǫ.
For the procedure GeneratePrivateRelease, we make use
of the inherent constraints of a prefix tree to boost utility.
The procedure only accesses a differentially private noisy
prefix tree, not the underlying database. As proven by Hay
et al. [26], a post-processing of differentially private results
remains differentially private. Therefore, Algorithm 1 as a
whole maintains ǫ-differential privacy.
Complexity Analysis. Algorithm 1 is of runtime complexity
O(|D| · |L|), where |D| is the number of trajectories in the
input database D and |L| is the size of the location universe.
It comes from the following facts. For BuildNoisyPrefixTree,
the major computational cost is node generation and trajectory
distribution. For each level of the noisy prefix tree, the number
of nodes to generate approximates k|D|, where k ≪ |L|
is a number depending on |L|. For each level, we need to
distribute at most |D| trajectories to the newly generated
nodes. Hence, the complexity of constructing a single level
is O(|D| · |L|). Therefore, the total runtime complexity of
BuildNoisyPrefixTree for constructing a noisy prefix tree of
height h is O(h|D| · |L|). In GeneratePrivateRelease, the
complexity of calculating the intermediate estimates for a
single root-to-leaf path is O(h2). Since there can be at most
|D| distinct root-to-leaf paths, the complexity of computing
all intermediate estimates is O(h2|D|). To compute consistent
estimates, we need to visit every node exactly twice, which
is of complexity O(|D| · |L|). Similarly, the computational
cost of generating the private release by traversing the noisy
prefix tree once in postorder is O(|D| · |L|). Since h is a very
small constant compared to |D| and |L|, the total complexity
of Algorithm 1 is O(|D| · |L|).
D. Extensions
In some applications, trajectory data may have locations
associated with timestamps. The time factor is often discretized
into intervals at different levels of granularity, e.g., hour, which
is typically determined by the data publisher. All timestamps
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Fig. 3. The distribution of trajectory length in the STM dataset
of a trajectory database form a timestamp universe. This
type of trajectories is composed of a sequence of location-
timestamp pairs in the form of loc1t1 → loc2t2 → · · · →
locntn, where t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tn.
Our solution can be seamlessly applied to this type of
trajectory data. In this case, we can label each node in the
prefix tree by both a location and a timestamp. Therefore, two
trajectories with the same sequence of locations but different
timestamps are considered different. For example, L1T1 →
L2T2 is different from L1T2 → L2T3, and the corresponding
prefix tree will have two non-overlapping root-to-leaf paths.
Consequently, when constructing the noisy prefix tree, in order
to expand a node lociti, we have to consider the combinations
of all locations and the timestamps in the time universe that
are greater than ti (because the timestamps in a trajectory are
non-decreasing), resulting in a larger candidate set. Due to
the efficient implementation we propose in Section IV-A, the
computational cost will remain moderate.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, our objective is to examine the utility of
sanitized data in terms of count queries and frequent sequential
pattern mining, and to evaluate the scalability of our approach
for processing large-scale real-life trajectory data. In partic-
ular, we study the utility improvements due to constrained
inferences. In the following, we refer the approach without
constrained inferences as Basic and the one with constrained
inferences as Full. We are not able to compare our solution to
others because there does not exist any other solution that is
able to process large-volume trajectory data in the framework
of differential privacy. Our implementation was done in C++,
and all experiments were performed on an Intel Core 2 Duo
2.26GHz PC with 2GB RAM.
A. Dataset
We perform extensive experiments on the real-life trajectory
dataset STM, which is provided by the Socie´te´ de transport de
Montre´al (STM). The STM dataset records the transit history
of passengers in the STM transportation network. Each trajec-
tory in the dataset is composed of a time-ordered list of stations
visited by a passenger within a week in 2009. The STM dataset
contains 1, 210, 096 records and has a location universe of
size 1, 012. The maximum trajectory length max|D| of the
STM dataset is 121 and the average length avg|D| is 6.7. We
show the distribution of trajectory length of the STM dataset
in Figure 3, which justifies our rationale of selecting h value
in Section IV-A. Note that similar observations can be found
in many real-life trajectory datasets, for example, the MSNBC
dataset 3 has the maximum trajectory length that is over 2500
times larger than the average trajectory length.
B. Utility
Count Query. In our first set of experiments, we examine
relative errors of count queries with respect to two different
parameters, namely the privacy budget ǫ and the noisy prefix
tree height h. We follow the evaluation scheme from previous
works [21], [24]. For each privacy budget, we generate 40,000
random count queries with varying numbers of locations. We
call the number of locations in a query the length of the query.
We divide the query set into 4 subsets such that the query
length of the i-th subset is uniformly distributed in [1, ih4 ] and
each location is randomly drawn from the location universe
L. The sanity bound s is set to 0.1% of the dataset size, the
same as [21], [24].
Figure 4 examines the average relative errors under varying
privacy budgets from 0.5 to 1.5 while fixing the noisy prefix
tree height h to 12. The X-axes represent the different subsets
by their maximum query length max|Q|. As expected, the
average relative error decreases when the privacy budget
increases because less noise is added and the construction
process is more precise. In general, our approach maintains
high utility for count queries. Even in the worst case (ǫ = 0.5
and max|Q| = 3), the average relative error of Full is still
less than 12%. Under the typical setting of the privacy budget
ǫ = 1.0, the relative error is less than 10% for all query
subsets. Such level of relative error is deemed acceptable
for data analysis tasks at the STM. The small relative error
also demonstrates the distinct advantage of a data-dependent
approach: noise would never accumulate exponentially as a
data-independent approach.
Figure 4 also shows that the constrained inference tech-
nique significantly reduces the average relative errors with
30%−74% improvement. The constrained inference technique
is beneficial especially when the privacy budget is small.
Figure 5 studies how the average relative errors vary under
different noisy prefix tree height h with query length fixed to
6. We can observe that with the increase of h, the relative
errors do not decrease monotonically. Initially, the relative
error decreases when h increases because the increment of
h allows to retain more information from the underlying
database. However, after a certain threshold, the relative error
becomes larger with the increase of h. The reason is that
when h gets larger, the privacy budget assigned to each level
becomes smaller, and therefore noise becomes larger. It is
interesting to point out that in fact a larger h value does
3MSNBC is publicly available at UCI machine learning repository
(http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/index.html).
0.0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 R
e
la
ti
v
e
 E
rr
o
r
Privacy Budget
STM-Full
STM-Basic
0.0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 R
e
la
ti
v
e
 E
rr
o
r
Privacy Budget
STM-Full
STM-Basic
(a) max|Q| = 3 (b) max|Q| = 6
0.0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 R
e
la
ti
v
e
 E
rr
o
r
Privacy Budget
STM-Full
STM-Basic
0.0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 R
e
la
ti
v
e
 E
rr
o
r
Privacy Budget
STM-Full
STM-Basic
(c) max|Q| = 9 (d) max|Q| = 12
Fig. 4. Average relative error vs. privacy budget.
not always lead to a noisy prefix tree with a larger height.
Recall that a path of a noisy prefix tree needs to have sufficient
number of trajectories to reach h levels. As a result, specifying
a larger h may not be able to obtain more information from
the underlying database, but only decreases the privacy budget
of each level. This confirms our analysis in Section IV-A
that in practice a good h value does not need to be very
large. Moreover, from Figure 5, we can learn that desirable
relative errors can be achieved within a relatively wide range
of h values (e.g., 10-16). Hence, it becomes easy for a data
publisher to select a good h value.
In addition, from Figure 5, we can see that the benefits of the
constrained inference technique are two-fold. First, we obtain
much smaller relative errors in all different settings. Second,
the relative errors become more stable with respect to varying
height values.
Frequent Sequential Pattern Mining. In the second set
of experiments, we demonstrate the utility of sanitized data
by a concrete data mining task, frequent sequential pattern
mining. Specifically, we employ PrefixSpan to mine frequent
sequential patterns 4.
Table III shows how the utility changes with different top
k values while fixing ǫ = 1.0 and h = 12. When k = 50, the
sanitized data (under both Basic and Full) is able to give the
exact top 50 most frequent patterns. With the increase of k
values, the accuracy (the ratio of true positive to k) decreases.
4An implementation of the PrefixSpan algorithm proposed in [42], available
at http://code.google.com/p/prefixspan/.
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Fig. 5. Average relative error vs. prefix tree height.
However, even when k = 250, the accuracy of Full is still as
high as 197/250 = 78.8%. In addition, we can observe that
the constrained inference technique again helps obtain more
accurate results for frequent sequential pattern mining. When
k = 250, the improvement due to constrained inferences is
10.4%.
Table IV presents the utility for frequent sequential pattern
mining under different privacy budgets while fixing h = 12
and k = 200. Generally, larger privacy budgets lead to more
true positives and fewer false positives (false drops). This
conforms to the theoretical analysis that a larger privacy
budget results in less noise and therefore a more accurate
result. Since the most frequent sequential patterns are of small
length (typically less than or equal to 3), they have large
supports from the underlying database. As a result, the utility
is insensitive to varying privacy budgets, and the accuracy is
high even when the privacy budget is small. When ǫ = 0.5,
the accuracy of Full is 160/200 = 80%. Furthermore, it can
be learned again that constrained inferences are also helpful
for frequent sequential pattern mining.
Table V studies how the utility varies under different noisy
prefix tree height values with ǫ = 1.0 and k = 200. It is
interesting to see that under Basic the best result is obtained
when h = 6. This again confirms our analysis that truncating
the tailing parts of long trajectories has very limited impact
on the results of frequent sequential pattern mining. For small
h values, due to a larger portion of privacy budget assigned,
the construction of each level is more precise, and therefore
the accuracy is even higher. With constrained inferences, we
TABLE III
UTILITY FOR FREQUENT SEQUENTIAL PATTERN MINING VS. k VALUE
True False Positives True False Positives
k Positives (False Drops) Positives (False Drops)
Basic Basic Full Full
50 50 0 50 0
100 92 8 96 4
150 131 19 139 11
200 150 50 169 31
250 171 79 197 53
TABLE IV
UTILITY FOR FREQUENT SEQUENTIAL PATTERN MINING VS. PRIVACY
BUDGET
True False Positives True False Positives
ǫ Positives (False Drops) Positives (False Drops)
Basic Basic Full Full
0.5 145 55 160 40
0.75 147 53 161 39
1.0 150 50 169 31
1.25 153 47 169 31
1.5 153 47 170 30
are able to obtain better and, more importantly, more stable
results. This is vital because under the same h value (e.g., 10-
16) the release can simultaneously maintain high utility for
both count queries and frequent sequential pattern mining.
C. Scalability
In the last set of experiments, we examine the scalability
of our approach, one of the most important improvement
over data-independent approaches. According to the analysis
in Section IV-C, the runtime complexity of our approach is
dominated by the database size |D| and the location universe
size |L|. Therefore, we study the runtime under different
database sizes and different location universe sizes for both
Basic and Full. Figure 6.a presents the runtime under different
database sizes with ǫ = 1.0, h = 20 and |L| = 1, 012. The
test sets are generated by randomly extracting records from
the STM dataset. We can observe that the runtime is linear
to the database size. When |D| = 1, 200, 000, the runtime
of Full is just 24 seconds. Moreover, it can be observed that
the computational cost of constrained inferences is negligible.
This further confirms the benefit of conducting constrained
inferences. Figure 6.b shows how the runtime varies under
TABLE V
UTILITY FOR FREQUENT SEQUENTIAL PATTERN MINING VS. HEIGHT
VALUE
True False Positives True False Positives
h Positives (False Drops) Positives (False Drops)
Basic Basic Full Full
6 154 46 167 33
8 154 46 168 32
10 153 47 168 32
12 150 50 169 31
14 150 50 169 31
16 148 52 168 32
18 145 55 167 33
20 146 54 167 33
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Fig. 6. Runtime vs. different parameters.
different location universe sizes. For each universe size, we
remove all locations falling out of the universe from the STM
dataset. This results in a smaller database size. Consequently,
we fix the database size for all test sets to 800,000. Again,
it can be observed that the runtime scales linearly with the
location universe size and that the computational cost of
constrained inferences is very small and stable under different
location universe sizes. As a summary, our approach is scalable
to large trajectory datasets. It takes less 25 seconds to sanitize
the STM dataset in all previous experiments.
VI. CONCLUSION
All existing techniques for privacy-preserving trajectory
data publishing are derived using partition-based privacy mod-
els, which have been shown failing to provide sufficient
privacy protection. In this paper, motivated by the STM case,
we study the problem of publishing trajectory data in the
framework of differential privacy. For the first time, we present
a practical data-dependent solution for sanitizing large-scale
real-life trajectory data. In addition, we develop a constrained
inference technique in order to better the resulting utility. We
stress that our approach applies to different types of trajectory
data. We believe that our solution could benefit many sectors
that face the dilemma between the demands of trajectory data
publishing and privacy protection. In future work, we intend
to investigate the utility of sanitized data on other data mining
tasks, for example, classification and clustering.
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